SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 2014 JUDGMENTS

                  CASE LAW DIGEST - DECEMBER , 2014

• State Bar Council has no competency to decide on election dispute of office bearers of any of the District Bar Associations or Local Bar Association. Only an ordinary Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue of validity of election. - says Punjab and Haryana High Court (Tahir Hussain Ruparya v. Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, through its Secretary, Law Bhawan Writ Petition No.14449 of 2014...Judgment Dated : 03/12/2014

• Lawyers who join legal field in search of greener pasture in the evening of their lives cannot and should not be equated with those who have devoted their whole lives to the profession. - Says Supreme Court     

           S.SESHACHALAM & ORS. ETC. v. CHAIRMAN, BAR COUNCIL OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.

          CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11454-11459 OF 2014

           Judgment Dated : 16/12/2014

            CORAM : M.Y. Eqbal .J, R. Banumathi .J

              ISSUE INVOLVED :
             Whether there is intelligible differentia between the classification of advocates who had set up practice straight after enrolment and other advocates who start their practice after demitting the office and are in receipt of pension and other benefits?

• The liberty of an individual is not absolute. Hence,The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. – Says Supreme Court

Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P and Anr.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2587 OF 2014

Judgment Dated : 16/12/2014

CORAM : DIPAK MISRA .J , UDAY UMESH LALIT .J

CATCHPHRASE :
1. An Unique Jurisprudence on "LIBERTY" can be traced in Para 16 of the judgment.

• The Supreme Court today issued directions to the Union of India and the State of Assam to ensure that effective steps shall be taken to prevent illegal access to the country from Bangladesh; to detect foreigners belonging to the stream of 1.1.1966 to 24.3.1971 so as to give effect to the provisions of Section 6(3) & (4) of the Citizenship Act and to detect and deport all illegal migrants who have come to the State of Assam after 25.3.1971.

Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors. v. Union of India
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 562 OF 2012

Judgment Dated : 17/12/2014

CORAM : Ranjan Gogoi .J, R.F. Nariman .J

CATCHPHRASE :

1. Sec. 6-A of the Citizenship Act stand valid till the time it is referred to the larger bench.

2. There is no lower as well as upper limit under the limitation act for filing writ petition under Art.32 of the Indian Constitution.

•  "The policy with regard to reservation in the matter of promotion to the employees is not legal and proper." - SC

South Central Railway Employees Co-Op. Credit Society Employees
Union v. B. Yashodabai and others
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7130 OF 2002

Judgment Dated : 08/12/2014

CORAM : ANIL R. DAVE .J, MADAN B. LOKUR .J, KURIAN JOSEPH .J

ISSUE INVOLED :

Whether the policy of reservation was to be followed only at the stage of recruitment of the employees or it was also to be followed in the matter of giving promotion to the higher cadre.

Supreme Court cautioned the High Court and Subordinate court stating that :
1. Once this Court decides an issue by taking a particular decision, it
cannot be said that the judgment delivered by this Court is per incuriam or this Court had not considered all relevant factors while delivering the said judgment.

2. When a higher court has rendered a particular decision, the said decision must be followed by a subordinate or lower court unless it is distinguished or overruled or set aside.

3.By not following the law laid down by this Court, the High Court or the Subordinate Courts would also be violating the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.

Reliance placed upon : Government of Goa v. A.H. Jaffar and sons and anr. 2008(11) SCC 18

• " Even if witness turns hostile during cross-examination, his Examination-in-chief cannot be outrightly discarded." - SC

Selvaraj @ Chinnapaiyan v. State represented by Inspector of Police
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 892 OF 2009

Judgment Dated : 09/12/2014

CORAM: Vikramajit Sen .J, Prafulla C. Pant .J

CONCLUSION:
1.If the court finds from the two different statements made by the same accused, only one of the two is believable, and what has been stated in the cross-examination is false, even if the witnesses have turned hostile, the conviction can be recorded believing the testimony given by such witnesses in the examination-in -chief. However, such evidence is required to be examined with great caution.

• The Supreme Court of India lifted ban on hookah smoking at the smoking places.

Narinder S. Chadha & Ors. v.. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. 

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10836 OF 2014

Judgment Dated : 08/12/2014

CORAM : Ranjan Gogoi .J , Rohinton Fali Nariman .J

CATCHPHRASE :
1. The definition of “smoking” contained in Section 3(n) of the Cigarettes Act A perusal of this definition shows that it includes smoking of tobacco in any form with the aid of a pipe, wrapper, or any other instrument, which
would obviously include a Hookah.
2.That being the case, “smoking” with a Hookah would be permissible under Rule 4(3) and the expression “no other service shall be allowed” obviously refers to services other than the providing of a Hookah.

• FIR should contain the essential features of the prosecution case but it cannot be expected to be an encyclopedia of whole prosecution case. - reiterated Supreme Court

Kanchanben Purshottambhai Bhanderi v. State of Gujarat
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1152 OF 2009

Judgment Dated : 05/12/2014

CORAM : M.Y. EQBAL .J, SHIVA KIRTI SINGH .J

Brief Facts of the Case:

Matter of Suicidal death(Committed suicide by taking poison) - The Accused is Mother-in-Law of the deceased - Charged under Sec.304-B and Sec.498-A IPC

Allegation on Mother -in-Law is basically on two grounds:

1. Mother-in-law had asked the deceased in the name of Nilesh
to bring a big box type cot, room furniture, juicer mixer, gifts and cash amount received in marriage from her parents otherwise Nilesh would divorce her.

2.When Hina told her mother in law that if such talk takes place she will commit suicide, the mother-in-law replied that her son will be relieved if she commits suicide.

• CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION may issue directions for maintenance of records for ready access of information by virtue of Sec.19(8)(a)(iv) of the RTI Act,2005. - Delhi High Court

THE REGISTRAR, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA v. COMMODORE LOKESH K.BATRA AND ORS.
W.P.(C) 6634/2011

Judgment Dated : 04/12/2014

CORAM : VIBHU BAKHRU .J

Brief Facts of the Case :

The Respondent has sought information about the pendency of cases and also the list of reserved cases in the specified manner. The CPIO of Supreme Court rejected the application and stated that all the information are available under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and the Supreme Court of India, Practice & Procedure ‘A Handbook of Information’.

CATCHPHRASE :

1.CIC as a guardian of the Act would ensure the proper implementation of the Act and can pass a direction to achieve the object of the Act.

2.Information regarding the functioning of public institutions is a fundamental right enshrined under Article 19 of the Constitution of India

• The Supreme Court was hearing the writ petition on 4/12/2014 in which Petitioner contended that it is the responsibility of Google India, Yahoo India and Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt. Ltd. to filter out/block the violated information and sponsored links.

In pursuance to this, a very reasonable ( at the same time evasive..smile emoticon ) contention was put forth by the respondent :

Reasonable Contention : The service provider/search engines only provide the carriage, technology for indexing information. The content information is provided by others. Wherever the service provider is providing only the carriage and transmission mechanism and not the contents/information, it is necessary that the distinction needs to be made between a service provider and a content provider.

SABU MATHEW GEORGE v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Writ Petition (Civil) No.341 of 2008

Date of Hearing : 04/12/2014

CORAM : JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA .J, UDAY UMESH LALIT .J

CATCHPHRASE:

1. Concept of Organic Search Result and Sponsered Links was explained in the order.

• The assurance to form promissory estoppel must come from the person in authority having competence to extend it.- Says Supreme Court

PASCHIMANCHAL VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LTD. & ORS. v. M/S ADARSH TEXTILES & ANR.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10707 OF 2014

Judgment Dated : 03/12/2014

CORAM : Jagdish Singh Khehar .J, Arun Mishra .J

CONCLUSION:
1.The Commission and the Corporation under the Electricity Act 2003 had no jurisdiction in the matter of subsidy which is the domain of the State Government.

• An excavation undertaken to lay the foundation of a building would not, ordinarily, carry the intention to use the excavated earth for the purpose of filling up or levelling. A blanket determination of liability merely because ordinary earth was dug up would not be justified.- says Supreme Court 

( Application of Sec.48(7) of Mumbai Revenue Code,1966 and MMRD Act,1957)

Promoters and Builders Association of Pune v. State of Maharashtra
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10717 OF 2014

Judgment Dated : 03/12/2014

CORAM : RANJAN GOGOI .J, R.K. AGRAWAL .J

CATCHPHRASE:

Excavation of ordinary earth without authorization under the Act of 1957 would make the person liable not only to payment of penalty under the Mumbai Revenue Code but also for criminal prosecution under the Act of 1957.

CONCLUSION:
1.A blanket determination of liability merely because ordinary earth was dug up would not be justified. what would be required is a more precise determination of the end use of the excavated earth; a finding on the correctness of the stand of the builders that the extracted earth was not
used commercially but was redeployed in the building operations.

• The 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated that " a registered owner of the vehicle should not be held liable for compensation if the vehicle is not in his possession and control."

HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Kumari Reshma and Ors. 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10608-10609 OF 2014

Judgment Dated : 01/12/2014

CORAM : DIPAK MISRA .J, ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN .J, UDAY UMESH LALIT .J

Brief Facts of the Case:

1.The Appellant was the registered owner along with respondent no.2. 2. The respondent no. 2 was in control and possession of the vehicle.
3. He had taken the vehicle from the dealer without paying the full premium to the insurance company and thereby getting the vehicle insured.

CATCHPHRASE:

1.Application of Sec.146 Motor Vehicle Act,1988

• The Supreme Court directed the 4 states A.P., M.P, Meghalaya and Telangana to notify Victim Compensation Scheme ( Sec.357-A CrPC) within one month from the date of receipt of this order.
• The Supreme Court further stated that "At the stage of final hearing it is obligatory on the part of the Court to advert to the provision and record a finding whether a case for grant of compensation has been made out and, if so, who is entitled to compensation and how much.

SURESH & ANR v. STATE OF HARYANA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 420 OF 2012

Judgment Dated : 28/11/2014

CORAM : V. GOPALA GOWDA .J, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL .J

Brief Facts of the Case:

The deceased was kidnapped - killed and thrown in the gutter - The accused has concealed all the material evidence - Sec.106 Indian Evidence Act,1872 attracted - Accused accordingly convicted.

CATCHPHARSE:

How this case is related to Victim Compensation Scheme?

1. The Complainant had also filed Criminal Revision No.1477 of 2004 for compensation to the family members of deceased and the same was dismissed by the Court without any reason.

2. This Matter also accompanied to the Hon'ble Supreme Court along with the above appeal and the Apex Court held that There is no reason as to why the victim family should not be awarded compensation under Section 357-A by the State.

3. The State of Haryana is liable to pay compensation to the family of the deceased.

4. The Apex Court determine the interim compensation payable for the two deaths to be rupees ten lacs, without prejudice to any other rights or remedies of the victim family in any other proceedings.

• "Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force". - SC

STATE OF M.P. & ORS. v. PARVEZ KHAN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10613 OF 2014

Judgment Dated : 01/12/2014

CORAM : T.S. THAKUR .J, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL .J

Brief Facts of the Case:
Parvez Khan was applied for compassionate appointment - he was involved in two criminal cases - Hence, S.P held that he was not eligible for appointment in Government service and closed his case.

OBSERVATION:
1. A candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity.

2.A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category.

CATCHPHRASE:
Even if the person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated.

• It is a settled principle of law that as per Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if a fact lies especially within the knowledge of a person, entire burden lies upon him about the said fact.- Says Madras High Court

TRIVIA: The term " any person" in the above mentioned act also include "Accused".

Lakshmi v. State
Crl.A.(MD)No.250 of 2007

Judgment Dated : 28/11/2014

CORAM : A. SELVAM .J , V.S.RAVI .J

Contempt of Court Act, 1971, Sec.12

Judges may invite/expect an informed and genuine discussion or criticism of judgments, but to incite a relatively illiterate audience against the Judiciary, is not to be ignored. - SC

M.V. JAYARAJAN v. HIGH COURT OF KERALA & ANR
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2099 OF 2011

Judgment dated: 30/01/2015

CORAM : VIKRAMAJIT SEN .J, C. NAGAPPAN .J

Brief Facts of the Case:

On 26.6.2010, the Appellant delivered a speech in a public meeting at Kannur, Kerala allegedly convened in connection with a hartal organised to protest against the hike in petroleum prices, which was widely reported by the media.

Observation :
It was, not the Petitioner’s province, as exercising his freedom of speech, to advise that “if those judges have any self respect, they should resign and quit their offices”

Right of the Hindu Wife to Maintenance: A relook at Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

The Law Commission of India have proposed an amendment to Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,1956 in pursuance to a decision given by the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Avtar Singh vs. Jasbir Singh, RSA No. 29/1988 (O&M), decision dated 11.02.2014, a lacuna in the position of Hindu Women qua their property and maintenance rights under the existing law was identified.

Mobile Charger is an Independent product - SC

The battery charger cannot be held to be a composite part of the cell phone but is an independent product which can be sold separately, without selling the cell phone.- Says Supreme Court

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. v. NOKIA INDIA PVT. LTD.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11486-11487 OF 2014

Judgment Dated : 17/12/2014

CORAM : SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAY .J, MADAN B. LOKUR .J

             

J U D G M E N T

Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

                         Leave granted.

2. These appeals have been preferred by the appellants- State of Punjab and others against the impugned orders dated 17th 

November, 2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at 

Chandigarh. By the impugned orders the Division Bench of the 

High court allowed the appeals preferred by the respondent

assessee, and held that cell phone battery charger is sold as 

composite package along with cell phone, and hence said charger 

cannot be excluded from the Entry for concessional rate of tax 

which applies to cell phones and parts thereof.

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows: 

The respondent-M/s. Nokia India Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter 

referred to as the “Company”) is a dealer registered under the 

Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the 

“Act”) in the District Mohali and is doing business of sale of 

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cell phones and their accessories. During the year 2005-06, the 

Company had made sales of 1,07,2679 pieces of cell phones with 

battery chargers and had paid tax at the rate of 4% on the sale 

value of battery chargers, the rate at which the tax on the sale 

of cell phone was paid. The value of the each of the battery 

charger if separately taken was to be Rs.120/- per piece as 

quoted by the respondent-Company itself. It comes to 

Rs.12,87,21,480/-. The scrutiny proceedings were initiated under 

Section 26 of the Act, 2005 read with Rules 36 and 43 of the 

Punjab Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 by issuing notice to the 

respondent separately for the Assessment Years 2005-06 and 2006

07. The Assessing Authority had held that the battery charger 

was an accessory chargeable to tax at the rate of 12.5%. The 

difference of 8.5% was calculated and it came to 

Rs.1,09,41,325/-. Interest under Section 32(1) was charged on 

the said amount amounting to Rs.21,25,491/-. Further penalty 

under Section 53 of the Act at the rate of 2% per month was 

imposed amounting to Rs.85,01,964/- The total demand for the 

assessment year 2005-06 was raised to Rs.2,15,68,780/-.

4. For the year 2006-07, the number of battery chargers sold 

were taken to be 1807725 pieces, the value at the rate of 

Rs.120/- per piece came to Rs.21,69,27,000/-. Differential 

amount of tax at the rate of Rs.8.5% was calculated to be 

Rs.1,84,38,795/-. Interest as per Section 32(1) of the Act was 

charged which came to Rs.25,24,175/-. Further, penalty under 

Section 53 of the Act at the rate of 2% per month was calculated 

which came to Rs.1,00,96,750/- and total demand raised vide 

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order of Assessing Authority for that year had been 

Rs.3,10,59,720/-.

5. Respondent-Company filed reply on 26th November, 2008, 24th 

December, 2008 and 9th January, 2009, inter alia, stating that 

the product was being sold as mobile/cellular phone under a 

single solo pack unit and was covered under Entry No.60 of 

Schedule ‘B’ of the Act and that no separate amount for battery 

charger was being claimed from the customers, and that only 

amount charged was for handsets. It was also stated by the 

respondent that for subsequent sale of the battery charger and 

the battery in the State of Punjab, Tax/VAT at the rate of 12.5% 

was being deposited. The respondent stated that the battery 

charger is an accessory to the main product that is mobile 

phone. 

6. The Assessing Authority vide detailed common order dated 

2nd March 2009 held that the battery charger being a separate 

item was liable to be taxed at general rate i.e. 12.5% and not 

at concessional rate applicable to the cell phones inter alia on 

the premise that the respondents were selling more than one 

product which were exigible in different rate of tax in a single 

pack and had themselves admitted the battery charger as a 

separate commodity was liable to payment of tax at the rate of 

12.5% applicable to the goods in residuary Schedule ‘F’ to the 

Act. The Assessing Authority further observed that even 

according to Entry 60 of Schedule ‘B’, the product included is 

only the cellular phone and not accessories thereof.

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7. The respondent filed Appeal Nos. 804 and 805/2009-10 

under Section 62(1) of the Act before the Deputy Excise & 

Taxation Commissioner(Appeals), Patiala Division, Patiala, inter 

alia, challenging the above said order dated 2nd March, 2009. 

The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Patiala 

vide judgment and order dated 26th August, 2009 dismissed both 

the appeals. The respondent being aggrieved by the above filed 

Appeal Nos.656-657 of 2009 under Section 63(1) of the Act before 

the Value Added Tax, Tribunal, Chandigarh, Punjab. The Tribunal 

by a detailed order dated 11th February, 2010 dismissed both the 

appeals, inter alia, observing that the battery charger is not a 

part of the cell phone. The Tribunal further held that the 

penalty under Section 53 of the Act should not have been imposed 

and thus set aside the same viz. Rs.85,01,964/- for the year 

2005-06 and Rs.1,00,96,750/- for the year 2006-07.

8. The respondent, against the above concurrent finding 

filed VAT Appeal Nos.54 & 55 of 2010 (O&M) before the High Court 

of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. By the impugned orders 

dated 17th November, 2010, the Division Bench of the High Court 

allowed the appeals holding that the battery charger is a part 

of the composite package of cell phone. 

9. Similar pleas as taken before the High Court have been 

taken by both the parties before this Court.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent 

demonstrated the composite package of cell phone, cell phone and 

battery charger and some other accessories like head phone. 

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10. The contention of the respondent had been that battery 

charger not being independently sold, was sold with the cell 

phone in same packing and hence tax chargeable was at the rate 

of 4% and proper tax had been paid and, therefore, there was no 

good ground to charge tax at the rate of 12.5% on sale of those 

battery chargers which are free with the cell phone in the 

composite package. 

11. On the other hand, according to the counsel for the 

appellant-State a battery charger is not a part of the cell 

phone but merely an accessory thereof even as per the 

respondents themselves, who had separately paid tax at the rate 

of 12.5% on the battery chargers sold separately. According to 

him, the battery charges are not covered under Entry 60(6)(g) in 

Schedule ‘B’ of the Act and was thus liable to be taxed at the 

rate of 12.5% on its value under Schedule ‘F’ of the Act which 

covers all residuary items not falling in any of the 

classifications of other Schedules of the Act.

12. We have heard rival contentions made on behalf of the 

parties and perused the record. 

Schedule ‘B’ of the Act contains list of goods taxable at 

the rate of 4%. Cell phone is mentioned in the said schedule and 

it finds further place at Serial No.6(g) under Entry 60 and is 

thereby liable to be charged at the rate of 4%.

13. According to the counsel for the respondent, charger is 

an integral part of the cell phone and the cell phone cannot be 

operated without the charger and when any person comes for cell 

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phone, he purchases the cell phone and then automatically takes 

away the charger for which no separate money is charged. 

However, it is admitted that whenever Company sells chargers 

separately then 12.5% tax is charged which is applicable to 

goods in residuary Schedule ‘F’ of Act.

14. On behalf of the State it was rightly argued that when 

Entry 60(6)(g) of Schedule ‘B’ of the Act does not mention 

accessories for the purpose of taxing the item/product at the 

rate of 4%, they need to be charged at 12.5% as per Schedule 

‘F’. It was contended that the battery chargers are not covered 

under Entry 60(6)(g) and even otherwise there is no mention of 

the charger in HMS Code 8525.20.17 under the Excise Act, and 

therefore, charger is liable to be taxed at the rate of 12.5%.

15. Sub-sub heading code 8525 and tariff no.8525.20.17 of the 

Central Excise Duty Act, is as under:

Chapter 85 Sub-heading Code 8525

Sub-sub heading Code 8525.20.17

Tariff 

No.8525.20.17

Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof, radio-telegraphs sound recorders and reproducers and parts and accessories of such articles.

Transmission apparatus for radiotelephony, radiobroadcasting or television, whether or not incorp.

“Transmission apparatus incorporating reception apparatus 

Cellular Telephones

‘Cellular telephone’ is in schedule B at Entry No.60(6)

(g) vide HSN Code No.8525.20.17. The Tariff No.8525.20.17 only 

relates to cellular telephone and not the accessories. The 

Schedule ‘B’ does not indicate that the cellular phone includes 

the accessories like the chargers either in the HSN Code or by 

elaborating in words.

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16. The Assessing Authority, Appellate Authority and the 

Tribunal rightly held that the battery charger is not a part of 

the mobile/cell phone. If the charger was a part of cell phone, 

then cell phone could not have been operated without using the 

battery charger. But in reality, it is not required at the time 

of operation.  Further, the battery in the cell phone can be 

charged directly from the other means also like laptop without 

employing the battery charger, implying thereby, that it is 

nothing but an accessory to the mobile phone. The Tribunal 

noticed that as per the information available on the website of 

Nokia, the Company has invariably put the mobile battery charger 

in the category of an accessory which means that in the common 

parlance also, the mobile battery charger is understood as an 

accessory. It has also been noticed by the Tribunal that a Nokia 

make battery charger is compatible to many models of Nokia 

mobile phones and also many models of Nokia make battery 

chargers which are compatible to a particular model of Nokia 

mobile phone, imparting various levels of effectiveness and 

convenience to the users.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to General 

Rules for interpretation of the First Schedule of the Import 

Tariff under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The classification of 

the goods in the Schedule for the purpose of Rule 3(b) in the 

general rules for interpretation of import tariff reads as 

follows:

“3(b) mixtures, composite goods consisting of different materials or made up of different components, and goods put up in sets for retail sale, which cannot be classified by reference to (a), shall be classified as if they consisted of 

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the material of component which gives them their essential character, insofar as this criterion is applicable.”

It was contended that composite goods being used 

consisting of different materials and different components, and 

goods put up in sets for retail sale, cannot be classified by 

reference to clause (a). However, such submission cannot  be 

accepted as it cannot be held that charger is an integral part 

of the mobile phone making it a composite good. Merely, making a 

composite package of cell phone charger will not make it 

composite good for the purpose of interpretation of the 

provisions. The word ‘accessory’ as defined in the Webster’s 

Comprehensive Dictionary (International) Volume-I is defined as:

“a person or thing that aids subordinately; an adjunct; appurtenance; accompaniment (2) such items of apparel as complete an outfit, as gloves, a scarf, hat or handbag.(3) A person who, even if not present, is concerned, either before or after, in the perpetration of a felony below the crime of treason.  Adj.(1) Aiding the principal design, or assisting subordinately the chief agent, as in the commission of a crime.(2) contributory; supplemental; additional: accessory nerves”.  

18. In M/s. Annapurna Carbon Industries Co. vs. State of 

Andhra Pradesh, (1976)2 SCC 273, this Court while examining the 

question whether “Arc Carbon” is an accessory to cinema 

projectors or whether comes under other cinematography 

equipments under Entry 4 of Schedule I to the A.P. General Sales 

Tax Act, 1957, defined accessories as:

“an object or device that is not essential in itself but that adds to the beauty, convenience or effectiveness of something else”.  

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19. In view of the aforesaid facts, we find that the 

Assessing Authority, Appellate Authority and the Tribunal 

rightly held that the mobile/cell phone charger is an accessory 

to cell phone and is not a part of the cell phone. We further 

hold that the battery charger cannot be held to be a composite 

part of the cell phone but is an independent product which can 

be sold separately, without selling the cell phone. The High 

Court failed to appreciate the aforesaid fact and wrongly held 

that the battery charger is a part of the cell phone.

20. In view of the finding recorded above, we have no other 

option but to set aside the impugned orders dated 17th November, 

2010 in VAT Appeal Nos.54 & 55 (O&M) of 2010 passed by the High 

Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The order passed by 

the Tribunal is affirmed. The appeals are allowed. No costs. 

.............................J.   [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]

  .............................J.                         [MADAN B. LOKUR] NEW DELHI; DECEMBER 17, 2014.

DOORDARSHAN MAY NOT BROADCAST ICC WORLD CUP NOW

The Delhi High Court today delivered a judgment stating that the live broadcasting signal shared by ESPN / STAR by virtue of Section 3 of the Sports Act with Prasar Bharati, shall not be carried in the designated Doordarshan channels under the must carry obligation cast by Section 8 of the CTN Act on cable operators and this shall operate prospectively.

BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA & ANR v. PRASAR BHARATI BROADCASTING CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ANR.
LPA No.1327/2007

Judgment Dated : 04/02/2015

CORAM : BADAR DURREZ AHMED .J , VIBHU BAKHRU .J

MODE OF TRANSMISSION OF SIGNAL:
BCCI is the content rights owner. It has sold these rights to ESPN / STAR, which, in turn, sends the live feed in an encrypted form to its satellites. From the said satellite, the feed is sent to its own channels (ESPN / STAR Sports, STAR Cricket, STAR Sports 2, STAR Cricket HD and ESPN HD) for distribution either through their own DTH networks or through cable operators. In either eventuality, they are subscribed services. Alongwith signals sent through their own distribution channels, ESPN / STAR shares the signals with Prasar Bharati, which is sent to Prasar Bharati in an encrypted form. Prasar Bharati re-transmits the signals in an encrypted form to its satellite, which, then streams that signal to three different networks.
The three networks being the DTH network of Prasar Bharati, the DD Kendras (terrestrial networks) and private cable operators through the must carry obligation stipulated under Section 8 of the CTN Act. Thus, cable operators have access to the broadcast of the sporting events through two different channels. One through the channels of ESPN / STAR and the other through the channels of Doordarshan. While, the former is to be paid for, the latter is free.

It is evident that what ESPN / STAR and BCCI are objecting to is not the transmission of the signals through the DTH and terrestrial networks of Prasar Bharati, but the free transmission of the signals by Prasar Bharati through cable operators which is adversely affecting the revenue generation of ESPN/STAR and BCCI

On Kasab's Death: Krishna Iyer J. Statement

"Society made him a criminal and a murderer''

Ajmal Kasab was hanged to death in the early hours of November 21 as a terrorist and as a killer. When he grew up in rural Pakistan, he had had only his primary education, and his parents were poor.

He was doubtless driven to despair, eventually becoming a hardened operator. Society made him a criminal and a murderer. He was of course guilty of the 26/11 round of killings and havoc in Mumbai.

Nevertheless, killing him secretly should be seen as injustice. Handing down the death sentence is a crime, and resort to the means of hanging makes it even more horrendous. In many ways, we are all guilty — all of humanity that abetted his killing and burial but could not reform him.

In my humble view, all humane societies, especially a society that swears by the Indian Constitution that is rooted in compassion, should abolish judicial executions. Mahatma Gandhi was against it. So was Jawaharlal Nehru.

Much more humane and touching has been the kindly attitude of Sonia Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi was brutally killed, and some of those who plotted and moved for the murder were sentenced to death.

Sonia Gandhi, a mother with a gentle heart, wrote thus to President K.R. Narayanan, spelling out her views against the hanging of her husband’s murderers.

She wrote: “[The] Supreme Court of India has confirmed the death sentence on four persons who were responsible for the assassination of my beloved husband Rajiv Gandhi.

“Our family does not think that the four held responsible for the heinous murder of my dear husband must be hanged. My son, my daughter or myself do not wish that the four murderers be hanged.

“In particular, we do not at all wish Nalini, mother of an eight-year-old child, to be hanged. I am aware how my children miss their father and we do not want another child to lose its parents together and get orphaned.

“As you are well aware, my children Rahul and Priyanka and myself are suffering untold mental agony day in, day out due to the loss of our beloved Rajiv. But neither my children nor myself would like the persons responsible for my husband’s tragic end to be hanged.

“Hence I humbly request you to stop their hanging and grant them pardon when they seek your clemency.”

When I was Kerala Home Minister in the 1950s, I had occasion to handle some pleas for commutation of the death sentence. In all those cases, I favoured the avoidance of the death sentence. Even as the State Governor was trying to express his views in one particular case, I intervened and said, no. In two cases I had strongly opposed the death sentence, and my view appealed to Lord Scarman, sitting in the Privy Council. He wrote to me an unusual letter mentioning how he was deeply touched by my passionate opposition to the death sentence.

Indeed, half the number of nations of our world have abolished the death sentence — including Great Britain. Lord Mountbatten was treacherously assassinated. But the assassin was not given the death sentence. For, Great Britain had abolished the death penalty. Even in the United States, many States have no provision for the death sentence. I have no doubt in my heart that Gandhiji’s country should not have killed Ajmal Kasab, who was after all young, and belonged to a poor family. Pakistani or not, he was a human being.

CONSENT : The most controversial term in Medico-Legal jurisprudence

CONSENT is the most controversial term in the field of Medico-Legal Jurisprudence. Consent of the patient has an immense practical importance to the clinicians. Doctors may do nothing to or for a patient without valid consent. This principle is applicable not only to surgical operations but also to all forms of medical treatment and to diagnostic procedures that involve intentional interference with the person. Given the volume of papers, treatises, and books on the subject of informed consent, it will only be possible to broad brush most elements of the concept. We have put most of comments, examples and cases as to how it affects medical practitioners and patients.

The term “Consent” in itself is the most controversial subject in Legal Jurisprudence. Consent is necessary for every medical examination, which should be obtained in or in the presence of disinterested party. Barring physical examination, any medical procedure requires written consent. Written consent should refer to one specific procedure and not blanket permission on admission to hospital. It is on the safer side to take the consent of spouse if the operation destroys or limits sexual functions. While it is not legally necessary it is good medical practice to consult with relatives of patient in patient’s best interest and ones this has been established then doctor can continue to give treatment in good faith. Consultation, consent and clinical confidence will never put the doctor in tort fessors cases. In the era of advancement of knowledge and technique the belief that as long as the patient signs everything will be, well misguided, if the doctor is not having reasonable care and skill.

It is also to be noticed that Consent and Medical Negligence are two different aspect which always conflict with each other.The Concept of Negligence with consent in Medical Jurisprudence and Negligence with consent in general sense is two different thing.Medical Jurisprudence had its hindrance with the former.Negligence with consent has to limit its scope so that it couldnot overlap with the private defence.

"Who knows better than the man himself as to what is irresistible to his body".

In general sense, The statement is appropriate.But in case of Medical Jurisprudence, this does not apply.

"Doctor knows better than the man about his internal skirmish".

This amounts create difference between Negligence with consent in Medico-Legal jurisprudence and Negligence with consent in other multi-disciplinary approach.

Hence,it is expedient to define “consent” in context with its implication in the subject-matter.The Concept of Hedonism also plays a major role in determining the consent of the parties involved in any kind of deed.

Consent is fundamental and established principle in the Indian law. Every person has the right to determine what shall be done to his body. Self-defense of body (IPC sections 96 to 102, 104, 106) provides right to the protection of bodily integrity against invasion by other. All medical procedures, including examinations, diagnostic procedures and medical research on patients potentially acts of bodily trespass or assault (IPC 351), in the absence of consent or statutory sanction.³ Treatment and diagnosis cannot be forced upon anyone who does not wish to receive them except in statutory sanction.

In India at present legal cases concerning absence of consent are rare. Such cases will increase in the coming years as medical techniques become more advanced, complicated, medical care becomes more widespread and level of awareness and education of population increases.